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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the 
annual Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research 
projects funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School 
of Business and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote 
speakers, plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show 
and social events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid 
environment where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry 
officials, accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate 
on finding applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and 
processes within the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of 
industry and academia, the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and 
collaborations which can identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, 
contract, financial, logistics and program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, 
electronic copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, 
please visit our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
Symposium during the third week of May, please visit our conference website at: 
www.researchsymposium.org  
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Modern military systems increasingly rely on the integration of multiple advanced 
technologies.  While these technologies vastly increase warfighter capabilities, they also 
introduce risk into the system design and development process that tends to increase both 
its cost and duration.  As acquisition cycle-times increase, warfighters must make do with 
dated technology for longer periods.  Thus, there is an incentive to push as many advanced 
technologies as possible into each program to maximize warfighter capability over the next 
acquisition cycle.  Unfortunately, the more new technologies a system has, the more risky its 
acquisition becomes, and consequently, its duration and cost increase even further.  Thus, 
there is a feedback effect that exacerbates the problem.  Open-architecture designs can 
partially alleviate this problem, but some technology decisions are so integral to a system’s 
design that they cannot be relegated to future upgrades.  Consequently, there is a tradeoff 
between incorporating these technologies now and increasing program risk or developing 
and evaluating them further but potentially postponing their application to future acquisition 
cycles.   Our paper will examine this tradeoff by considering a new technology’s contribution 
to program risk. 
Introduction 
Despite repeated attempts at reforming the defense acquisition process, Defense 
Department programs continue to experience substantial cost overruns, schedule delays, 
and performance shortfalls.  While there are likely multiple causes for reform failure, this 
paper aims to address only one of the critical issues that contribute to these acquisition 
challenges. That issue is the maturity of critical technologies employed in major defense 
acquisition programs. 
There have been repeated calls for the Department of Defense to use evolutionary 
rather than revolutionary acquisition strategies.  In fact, the DoD has revised its acquisition 
polices to that end (GAO, 2003).  Despite these new policies, recent GAO reports have 
indicated that most major acquisition programs are still revolutionary rather than evolutionary 
and do not follow current DoD guidelines for knowledge-based acquisition (GAO, 2006, April 
5; 2006, April 13; 2006, December 21).  It seems that every program is an exception. Why is 
this? 
To that end, this paper investigates two key questions:  What level of maturity is 
acceptable for a technology to be included in a major acquisition program, and what 
obstacles prevent the DoD from implementing an evolutionary acquisition process? 
Our findings will show that, relatively speaking, it is better to employ mature 
technologies; thus, an evolutionary strategy is superior under most circumstances to a 
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revolutionary strategy in terms of getting capabilities delivered to the warfighter.  We also 
found, however, that when a program relies on multiple, critical technologies, especially 
those intended for a multi-mission role, the evolutionary strategy is unstable.  There is a 
natural tendency to revert to the revolutionary technology strategy even though it is not in 
the best interest of the warfighter. 
This paper is structured in the following manner.  First, we discuss the background of 
knowledge-based, evolutionary acquisition and why it is considered important for defense 
acquisition.  Second, we develop a high-level simulation model of acquisition to help us 
investigate these issues.  Third, we use the model to analyze defense acquisition policy 
alternatives regarding technological maturity.  Finally, we conclude with the policy 
implications of this analysis.  
Background 
The troubled history of the DoD acquisition system (as well as the repeated attempts 
to reform it) are well known, and we will not recount them here (See Pennock, Rouse & 
Kollar, 2007 and GAO, 2006, April 13).  Instead, our focus will be on the more recent 
attempts to reform the acquisition system by employing knowledge-based business 
practices and evolutionary acquisition. 
A common criticism of the defense acquisition process is that it tends to emphasize 
large leaps in capability achieved by utilizing promising but immature technology.  Changes 
to defense acquisition policy over the last several years have attempted to reverse this trend 
by creating a milestone process in which programs must meet certain requirements before 
proceeding from one phase to the next (DOD, 2003a, 2003b). (See Figure 1.)  Part of this 
milestone process is an assessment of the maturity of technologies to be employed in 
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Figure 1. Defense Acquisition Management Framework 
 (DoD, 2003b) 
 
Technological maturity is typically assessed using the Technology Readiness Level 
(TRL) scale (Table 1).  The TRL scale is a qualitative assessment scale that is designed to 
aid decision-makers by providing some sense of a given technology’s level of risk.  In 
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general, one assumes that the higher the TRL level, the less uncertainty a technology brings 
to a program.  It is important to note that the TRL scale evaluates a technology in isolation 
and does not consider the integration risks (Smailing & deWeck 2007).  Regardless, the 
aforementioned policy changes encourage programs to utilize more mature, demonstrated 
technologies (i.e., higher TRL levels) rather than more immature and, consequently, more 
risky technologies.  For example, qualification to enter the system development phase 
nominally requires all critical technologies to be at TRL level 6 or higher (though the GAO 
recommends at least TRL level 7 (GAO 2006, April 13)). 
Technology Readiness Level Description 
1.  Basic principles observed 
and reported. 
Lowest level of technology readiness.  Scientific research 
begins to be translated into applied research and 
development.  Examples might include paper studies of a 
technology's basic properties. 
2.  Technology concept and/or 
application formulated. 
Invention begins.  Once basic principles are observed, practical 
applications can be invented.  Applications are speculative, and 
there may be no proof or detailed analysis to support the 
assumptions.  Examples are limited to analytic studies. 
3.  Analytical and experimental 
critical function and/or 
characteristic proof of concept. 
Active research and development is initiated.  This includes 
analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically validate 
analytical predictions of separate elements of the 
technology.  Examples include components that are not yet 
integrated or representative. 
4.  Component and/or 
breadboard validation in 
laboratory environment. 
Basic technological components are integrated to establish that 
they will work together.  This is relatively "low fidelity" compared 
to the eventual system.  Examples include integration of "ad 
hoc" hardware in the laboratory. 
5.  Component and/or 
breadboard validation in 
relevant environment. 
Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly.  The 
basic technological components are integrated with reasonably 
realistic supporting elements so it can be tested in a simulated 
environment.  Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory 
integration of components. 
6.  System/subsystem model 
or prototype demonstration in a 
relevant environment. 
Representative model or prototype system, which is well 
beyond that of TRL 5, is tested in a relevant 
environment.  Represents a major step up in a technology's 
demonstrated readiness.  Examples include testing a prototype 
in a high-fidelity laboratory environment or in simulated 
operational environment. 
7.  System prototype 
demonstration in an 
operational environment. 
Prototype near, or at, planned operational system.  Represents 
a major step up from TRL 6, requiring demonstration of an 
actual system prototype in an operational environment such as 
an aircraft, vehicle, or space.  Examples include testing the 
prototype in a test-bed aircraft. 
8.  Actual system completed 
and qualified through test and 
demonstration. 
Technology has been proven to work in its final form and under 
expected conditions.  In almost all cases, this TRL represents 
the end of true system development.  Examples include 
developmental test and evaluation of the system in its intended 
weapon system to determine if it meets design specifications. 
9.  Actual system proven 
through successful mission 
operations. 
Actual application of the technology in its final form and under 
mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational 
test and evaluation.  Examples include using the system under 
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operational mission conditions. 
Table 1. DoD Technology Readiness Levels 
(DoD, 2006, Ch. 10.5.2) 
 
What is the rationale behind a policy that requires a relatively mature level of 
technology?   The issue is that development of immature technology is fairly unpredictable 
in terms of cost, schedule, and efficacy.  When a program contains multiple immature 
technologies, these tend to delay the program and add cost.  If technology development is 
done in concurrence with system development, the problem can be exacerbated because 
unforeseen outcomes can lead to significant rework.  The net result is that, on average, 
programs with immature technologies will take longer and cost more.  Consequently, 
warfighters must make due with obsolete equipment longer, thus increasing the chances 
that they will engage in combat operations with less capability than they could have had 
otherwise. 
As a result, it would seem that a superior approach would be to reduce cycle-time by 
setting more modest goals for each deployed increment of capability.  This is often referred 
to as an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary acquisition process, and there are several 
ways to achieve such a process.  First, one can make use of open-architecture design and 
spiral development.  The idea behind spiral development is that the system can be deployed 
with an initial mature technology, which can then be upgraded over time (Johnson & 
Johnson, 2002).  This approach can work well for technologies that are loosely coupled to 
the system design.  In other words, there is a clear, well-defined interface such that changes 
in the implementation of the subsystem or technology to be upgraded do not interfere with 
the rest of the system.  Open architecture design is perfect for a technology such as a 
software algorithm.  Assuming that the software interface has been standardized, it is 
comparatively straightforward to replace an old software component with a new one.  This 
approach, in fact, has been demonstrated successfully on submarine acoustic systems 
(Boudreau, 2006). 
When technologies or subsystems are tightly coupled to the overall system, 
however, any changes to the design of the subsystem impact the design of the whole 
system.  Thus, open-architecture design is not always a feasible alternative.  An extreme 
example would be the hull-form of a surface combatant.  Take, for instance, the tumblehome 
hull design of the new Zumwalt-class destroyer.  If some critical issues were to arise with the 
hull design, it is likely that a significant portion of the ship would have to be redesigned.  Of 
course, hull form is a rather obvious case, but there are many mission-critical systems in any 
modern military system that exhibit varying degrees of interaction with the rest of the system 
design.  Since changes to these systems would require substantial rework, it is imperative 
that they be mature prior to system integration, hence the appeal of evolutionary acquisition. 
Under evolutionary acquisition, system acquisition cycles are more rapid and make 
use of mature, available technology.  The development of new technologies is detached 
from the acquisition process, so that the fate of a program does not hinge on the success or 
failure of any one risky technology.  The evolutionary design process is enforced via a 
knowledge-based acquisition process.  The program contains a number of evaluation points 
or milestones.  At each milestone, the program must demonstrate that it has met certain 
developmental requirements in order to proceed to the next phase.  For example, Milestone 
A entails requirements such as an Initial Capabilities Document, an Analysis of Alternatives 
(AoA), a Systems Engineering Plan (SEP), and Technology Readiness Assessment. 
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Despite the fact that the DoD acknowledges evolutionary and knowledge-based 
acquisition as best practices and has committed them to policy, recent GAO reports have 
indicated that most major acquisition programs do not follow these polices (GAO, 2006, April 
5; 2006, April 13; 2006, December 21).  Consequently, these major acquisition programs 
have continued to experience significant cost overruns and major delays.  In particular, 
these reports have indicated that most major acquisition programs are revolutionary rather 
than evolutionary, and they are permitted to bypass major milestone requirements.  Most 
rely on multiple immature technologies that are not fully developed before overall system 
development begins.  The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has acknowledged that 
this is a common practice (GAO 2006, April 13). 
One example in particular that makes the consequences of this acquisition approach 
clear is the case of WIN-T and JNN-N.  The Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-
T) is the next generation tactical communications network for the US Army and will provide a 
major leap forward in battlefield communications.  However, when the program moved into 
the system-development phase, 9 of the system’s 12 critical technologies were immature 
(GAO 2006, December 21).  As a result, WIN-T has been unavailable for both Operation 
Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.  Because it was determined that there was 
an urgent need for better battlefield communications to support these two operations, the 
Joint Network Node-Network (JNN-N) program was created.  To address this urgent need, 
the JNN-N program bypassed many of the normal acquisition procedures to accelerate 
fielding of the system.   While this may be understandable given the urgency of the situation, 
acquisition procedures are in place to ensure that acquired systems function properly and 
are cost-effective.  As the GAO points out:  
When the Army opted to pursue large technology advances in networking 
capabilities to support the future forces through WIN-T, rather than pursuing a 
more incremental approach, it accepted a gap in providing tactical networking 
capabilities to the warfighter […] If the Army had followed DOD’s acquisition 
policy preferences, which emphasize achieving capabilities in increments 
based on mature technologies to get capabilities into the hands of the user 
more quickly, it might have been able to get needed communications 
capabilities to the warfighter sooner. (GAO 2006, December 21) 
Thus, a more evolutionary approach to acquisition may have reduced the risks to the 
warfighter by both avoiding capability gaps as well as mitigating the need for emergency 
programs that bypass the usual acquisition procedures. 
To summarize, the Department of Defense claims to favor evolutionary acquisition, 
but does not follow through in practice.  The GAO asserts that there are a number of causes 
for this, one of which is the lack of mandatory controls on the milestone process (GAO 2003, 
2006, April 5, 2006, April 13, 2006, December 21).  But if evolutionary acquisition is 
superior, why would the DoD not follow its tenets even without the mandatory controls?  
There are really two possibilities.  Either evolutionary acquisition is not the best approach 
and when given the flexibility program managers avoid it, or the nature of the acquisition 
system itself works against the successful implementation of evolutionary methods. 
  




To better understand the nature of evolutionary acquisition, we must model the 
impact of a program’s technology strategy on the level of capability actually deployed in the 
field.  In particular, a technology strategy consists of the technologies selected to improve 
each capability that a system provides.  A technology policy that emphasizes major 
increases in capability would likely rely on immature technology and, thus, would be a 
revolutionary strategy.   Consequently, the acquisition program will require a substantial 
technology development phase.  On the other hand, a technology strategy that emphasizes 
small improvements in technology would rely on more mature technology and could be 
considered an evolutionary strategy.  This type of strategy effectively detaches technology 
development from the acquisition program and, consequently, would have a relatively short 
technology-development phase. 
What we would like to examine is the impact of the selected technology strategy over 
the long-term.  Thus, we are concerned with the deployed capability resulting from a 
sequence of acquisition programs.  In particular, we are assuming that our objective is to 
improve the capabilities of a particular class of system such as a surface combatant or air 
superiority fighter.  To model this, we must establish a means to link the selected technology 
strategy to the time required to complete an acquisition program.  This will determine when a 
capability improvement is deployed.  After an acquisition program completes, we assume 
that another begins immediately to procure the next iteration of that system. 
To accomplish this, we will assume that we can model each acquisition program as a 
small PERT chart.  PERT charts are a common program management tool for managing 
schedule risk.  For our particular model, we will assume a fairly simple formulation.  We will 
assume that there is a technology-development stage followed by a system-integration 
stage.  Each acquisition program contains a number of critical technologies that must be 
developed for the program to reach a successful conclusion.  We will assume that each 
critical technology can be developed in parallel, but all must be complete before system 
integration can begin.  This is an admitted simplification that works both for and against the 
acquisition program.  The assumption of parallel technology development is somewhat 
optimistic as the outcome of each critical technology may be somewhat interdependent.  
The assumption that all development must be completed is somewhat pessimistic because 
some integration work can be done based on the estimated outcome of technology 
development.  However, since unanticipated outcomes in the technology-development 
phase can lead to substantial rework in the integration phase, this is not an unreasonable 
assumption.  Given those assumptions, we can structure each acquisition program as 
shown in Figure 2. 
  












Figure 2. Simplified PERT Chart for an Acquisition Program 
Keeping in line with the standard PERT formulation, we will assume that the duration 
of each technology development activity is stochastic and beta distributed (Figure 3).  The 
beta distribution is appealing is this context because it has finite upper and lower bounds on 
the activity duration, hence its use in PERT. 
 
Figure 3. Example Beta Distribution ( = 2,  = 5) 
 
One notion we would like to capture is the relationship between the maturity of a 
technology selected for an acquisition program and the amount of schedule risk it entails.  It 
is fairly safe to assume that the more immature a technology is, the more schedule risk there 
is in its development.  In fact, we can go one step further and assume that it follows the law 
of diminishing returns.  In other words, each additional increment of schedule risk that we 
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accept buys a reduced amount of gain in capability.  To make this relationship more 
concrete, we must select metrics for the gain in capability and the level of schedule risk.  For 
the former, we will consider the percent gain in capability over the currently deployed 
capability.  Thus, a relatively low percent gain would be considered an evolutionary 
technology whereas a large percent gain would be a revolutionary technology.  Since we 
would only accept an immature technology in exchange for an increase in capability, we can 
assume that for the purposes of our model, the percent gain in capability is also an 
acceptable proxy for technological maturity.  As for the risk, we will assume that schedule 
risk is encapsulated in the upper bound of the probability distribution for the duration of 
technology development.  For the sake of simplicity, the lower bound and shape parameters 
of the beta distribution will remain constant.  Thus, if we select a particular percent gain in 
capability as our technology policy, it determines a particular upper bound on the distribution 
of the development time of that technology.  This is illustrated in Figure 4.  When we change 
the upper bound of the distribution, two things occur.  We increase the expected time to 
develop the technology, and we increase the spread of the distribution.   
 
Figure 4. Tradeoff between Risk (the Upper Bound on the Duration of Technology 
Development) and Return (the Growth in Capability) 
 
We define a technology policy as the targeted percent gain in capability for each 
acquisition program.  Thus, if a more aggressive target is selected, there will be a greater 
increase in capability for each new system deployed.  However, the expected duration of the 
acquisition cycle will also increase.  Given our model structure, we can use Monte Carlo 
simulation to generate possible capability trajectories.  This is accomplished in the following 
manner.  First, sample from the beta distribution for each technology is included in the 
acquisition program.  The integration phase cannot begin until all technology development is 
complete, so the longest sampled time dictates the length of the technology-development 
phase.  That time plus the time required for integration is the total time required for the 
acquisition program.  At the end of the acquisition program, each capability is increased by 
the gain targeted in the technology policy.  The process then repeats again with the next 
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acquisition program.  This yields a capability trajectory for the technology policy.  One 
example is shown in Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5. Sample Capability Trajectory 
 
We see in Figure 5 that, with our model, the capability trajectory is a step function 
because of the discrete nature of acquisition programs.  Thus, we see that the longer the 
acquisition cycle, the longer warfighters must make due with older equipment.  To facilitate 
analysis, we would like to capture the value of any given capability trajectory as a single 
number.  We will do so through the average deployed capability.  To calculate the average 
deployed capability, we select a time horizon, say 50 years, and then calculate the average 
value of capability over that time interval.  While this is not a perfect metric, the notion we 
are trying to capture is the level of capability that warfighters can expect from their 
equipment if they are forced to engage in hostilities without warning.  This allows us to 
compare the competing strategies of small-but-rapid capability increments versus large-but-
infrequent capability increments.  If we generate many sample capability trajectories for a 
particular technology policy, we can calculate the expected average deployed capability to 
evaluate the efficacy of that policy.  
Analysis Results 
The first question we would like to consider is whether it is better to pursue an 
evolutionary vs. a revolutionary technology strategy.  From a purely performance standpoint, 
we can answer this question using the model we described above but with only a single 
technology for each acquisition program.  To make this more concrete, we will assume 
some parameter values and run our Monte Carlo simulation over a range of technology 
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between 10 and 30%.  The relationship to the upper bound of the duration distribution is 
described in Figure 4.  This is just the function: 
Function 1.   4771210Bound Upper 0718410Gain Capability ..  
Of course, other functional forms are possible, and we will discuss these in more 
detail later.  Under this function, the upper bound of the resulting beta distribution can vary 
between 2 and 20 years.  As far as defining the rest of the beta distribution, the lower bound 
is always 2 years, and the shape parameters are  = 2 and  = 5.  For the purposes of 
calculating the average deployed capability, the initial level of capability is always one, and 
the time horizon is 50 years.  To emphasize the impact of technology development, we will 
assume that the duration of the system-integration step is zero.  When we run the Monte 
Carlo simulation for the for possible technology policies within the range of 10 to 30% 
capability gain, we obtain the results that are depicted in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6. Performance of Technology Policies for a Single Technology 
 
We can see in Figure 6 that there is a single optimal technology policy for our 
performance metric: expected average deployed capability.  In fact, the optimal policy is a 
relatively modest 13.8% target improvement in capability for each acquisition cycle.  This 
policy results in an expected average deployed capability of 4.31.  This result seems to 
suggest that from a performance standpoint it is better to take smaller, more frequent steps 
than larger, less frequent steps.  In other words, evolutionary is better than revolutionary.  
But is this always the case?  There are two critical features of this model that we can vary.  
First, we can alter the integration time.  In the above case, it was set to zero.  But if, for 
example, it was set to two years, the single technology optimal policy increases to 20%.  
This result is reasonable because longer integration times essentially impose more 
overhead on the acquisition process.  Consequently, it is advantageous to target a larger 
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increase in capability to compensate for the integration delay.  However, in this model, 
system integration is not linked to the maturity of the technology selected.  In some cases, a 
more immature technology may be more difficult to integrate with the rest of the system and, 
hence, would actually exacerbate delays. 
Impact of Risk vs. Return 
The second feature of the model we should consider is the shape of the curve that 
relates risk and return.  The function used in our model is displayed in Figure 4.  This curve 
exhibits the diminishing return to increasing risk that was mentioned earlier.  But what would 
happen if the penalty for additional risk were more severe?  In other words, what if taking on 
large amounts of risk resulted in very little gain in capability?  As an excursion, we will 
assume that the relationship between the gain in capability and the upper bound of duration 
is determined by the following exponential relationship. 
Function 2. 0.300001e -0.81104Gain Capability Bound Upper -0.7   
We find that under this risk-return model, the optimal single technology policy 
increases to 26%.  If, on the other hand, we removed the diminishing returns to risk entirely, 
we would use the following linear relationship: 
Function 3.   0.077778 Bound Upper0.011111Gain Capability   
Under this function our optimal policy is 10%, the minimum allowable.  This behavior 
is perhaps better understood visually.  Figure 7 shows all three of the curves discussed.  
Note that all three pass through the same maximum and minimum points, so the issue is just 
the shape of the curve.  Notice also that the exponential curve increases sharply then 
flattens out.  The high initial derivative means that on the lower end of the curve, one can 
actually gain quite a bit of capability for very little risk.   But the curve quickly flattens out 
such that each additional gain in capability requires a huge increase in risk.  Thus, there is a 
natural optimal point.  The same is true for the baseline curve. While it is not as severe, 
there is essentially a natural optimal increment size.  For the linear curve, the derivative is 
constant, so the best strategy is to minimize the size of the increment.  In this extreme case 
in which there is no integration time, we can essentially deploy infinitesimally small 
increments of capability continuously.   Thus, the linear case ensures that the best possible 
capability is available at any time.  While this case would be desirable, it is certainly not 
realistic.  Something akin to the baseline case is more reasonable because, in reality, there 
is usually some minimum reasonable increment that can be deployed. 
  




Figure 7. Comparison of Different Risk-return Relationships 
 
It is important to note that changing the scale of the risk-return relationship will 
certainly change the optimal policy, but here we focused on the shape. This is because the 
shape of the curve is what determines how aggressive the optimal policy is within the 
feasible ranges of capability and risk.  What we can conclude from this analysis is that, from 
a performance standpoint, there is a natural optimal technology policy, and, except in 
extreme circumstances, that policy is not going to be the maximum achievable leap in 
capability. 
Impact of Multiple Technologies 
Thus, for a single technology we find that the best policy will most likely be to take 
small steps with more mature technologies; but what happens when a program depends on 
the integration of multiple critical technologies?  First, we will assume that each technology 
provides a different capability.   For example, a multi-mission surface combatant would have 
critical technologies that provide anti-air and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.   
Presumably, stakeholders for each area or capability would want to maximize their 
respective average deployed capability.  But with multiple technologies in the same 
program, the actions of one affect the outcome for others.  For example, the selection of an 
immature technology for anti-air warfare could delay the delivery of the next ship class and, 
consequently, delay the deployment of the next generation of anti-submarine warfare 
technology.  From the perspective of stakeholders in anti-submarine warfare, the expected 
delay means that if they must wait, they should target a larger gain in capability for their area 
to compensate for the delay.  But since program completion depends on both technologies, 
the reciprocating decision could actually exacerbate delays further. In order to understand 
stakeholder behavior when a program incorporates multiple critical technologies, we will 
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employ game theory. (For an introductory treatment of game theory see Gibbons (1992).  
For a more advanced treatment see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).) 
Game theory allows us to consider the strategies of rational competing parties.  A 
technology policy would be the targeted percent increase for each capability for each 
acquisition cycle.  For example, for anti-air we might target a 15% increase per cycle, while 
for anti-submarine we might target a 10% increase.  Presumably, stakeholders for each area 
want to maximize the average deployed capability for their area of concern.  To employ 
game theory, we must find the best response functions for the stakeholders for each of the 
capability areas.  We can accomplish this by finding the optimal response to each possible 
action by the other player.  Any intersection points between the best response functions 
constitute Nash equilibria.  A Nash equilibrium is a stable point in strategy at which either 
player would be worse off if they deviated from that strategy.  To demonstrate this concept, 
we will assume that there are two critical technologies in each acquisition program.  Both 
have the identical risk-return behavior from the baseline case above. The resulting best 
response functions can be seen in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Stakeholder Best Response Functions for a System with Two Critical 
Technologies  
(The intersection of the two functions is the Nash equilibrium.) 
 
The plotted points in Figure 8 represent the best responses over the selected 
policies.  Since Monte Carlo simulation was used, there is some statistical noise in these 
results.  Consequently, a linear function was fit to the best response data for each player.  
We can see from the best response functions that the two players engage in reciprocating 
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the other player is to increase his as well.  Since we assumed two identical players, the 
Nash equilibrium is symmetric and much more aggressive than what is optimal for a system 
with single critical technology.  In fact, the equilibrium solution is for each player to target a 
23% increase in capability for each acquisition cycle—resulting in an average deployed 
capability of 2.7 for each.  This is far below the optimal single technology result of 4.31.  The 
practical implication is that older generations of technology stay in the field much longer. 
The resulting Nash equilibrium would seem to corroborate the behavior described 
previously.  If one player chooses a particular technology policy, it is in the best interest of 
the other player to choose one that is just slightly more aggressive.  Consequently, the first 
player might as well choose a more aggressive one himself, and so on.  The result is an 
equilibrium state with a much more aggressive technology policy than we would expect from 
the single technology analysis.  To better understand this result, let us consider the case in 
which there are still two critical technologies, but the two players cooperate in selecting a 
technology policy. 
To find the best cooperative technology policies, we can search over a grid of 
possible policy combinations.  The results are plotted in Figure 9.   The plotted points form 
the space of all possible policy outcomes.  Since we would like to maximize the performance 
over each capability, we must find the Pareto optimal set of polices.  A Pareto optimal policy 
is defined such that to improve performance of one capability would mean sacrificing 
performance on another.   The Pareto optimal set is designated by the squares in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Performance Space of all Possible Technology Policies  
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We note that the Pareto optimal frontier allows us to trade off some performance 
between the two capabilities; but even so, the entire frontier is superior to the Nash 
equilibrium achieved in the non-cooperative case.  For the sake of comparison, let us 
consider the optimal symmetric policy from the frontier.  Under this policy, the target is a 
12% improvement per acquisition cycle and an expected average deployed capability of 
3.99.  Note that this is a significant improvement over the non-cooperative solution but not 
as good as the single technology solution. 
What does this result tell us?  We can conclude several things.  First, the best 
solution for a program that relies on multiple critical technologies is a cooperative one in 
which a small amount of capability is sacrificed from each area to bring the overall cycle-
time down.  We can see this sacrifice when we compare the optimal symmetric policy to the 
single technology policy.  Thus, we see that there is a price to pay for including multiple 
capabilities in a single system.  While there are likely cost advantages, there will be some 
sacrifice in performance (barring synergistic effects) because the integration of multiple 
technologies increases acquisition cycle-time.  More importantly, however, is that the 
optimal solution is not stable in that it is not a Nash equilibrium.  Therefore, there is always 
an incentive to deviate.  Let us say, for example, that we select the optimal symmetric 
technology policy for our system.  Assuming that everyone else follows this policy, it is in the 
best interest of anyone supporting a particular capability to push for a slightly more 
aggressive technology for his area.  He will end up better off.  But since all have an incentive 
to deviate, if one deviates, all will likely deviate, and we end up at the Nash equilibrium.  
This is exactly where we do not want to be. 
To better elaborate on this point, it is instructive to consider the cartel problem from 
economics.  In a cartel, several firms make a price-fixing agreement so that they can all earn 
greater profits than if they competed.  Thus, they set a price higher than the market 
equilibrium price.  However, there is an incentive to deviate.  If one firm in the cartel charges 
slightly less than the agreed-upon price, it will capture the market and make much more 
money than it would by following the cartel agreement.  Consequently, cartels tend to be 
unstable without strict monitoring and enforcement. 
We see that our situation here is quite analogous.  For a given system, it is in the 
best interest of all stakeholders and decision-makers to sacrifice a little bit of capability in 
each critical area in order to pursue an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary policy.  
However, it is always in the best interest for any given stakeholder to push for just a little bit 
more capability in his respective area.  Thus, the best solution is unstable.  This 
phenomenon could explain, at least in part, why the acquisition system in the Department of 
Defense consistently pursues revolutionary rather than evolutionary acquisition programs 
despite policies to the contrary.  The above game theory analysis indicates that in the 
absence of enforcement, the rational actions of decision-makers with good intentions will 
lead to poor acquisition policy.  The implication here is that if the Department of Defense is 
serious about evolutionary acquisition, it cannot expect voluntary compliance.  Compliance 
must be enforced. 
In the interests of robustness, we should consider the sensitivity of this result.  If we 
increase the integration time to two years, the competitive policy is a 29% increase in 
capability per cycle for an average deployed capability of 1.78—whereas the optimal 
symmetric cooperative policy is an 18% increase in capability per cycle with an average 
deployed capability of 2.05.  Thus, an increase in the integration delay makes both policies 
more aggressive, but the relationship between competition and cooperation is preserved.  
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As for the shape of the risk-return curve, if we examine the exponential case, we find that 
the competitive-cooperative relationship is still preserved but becomes less dramatic.  The 
competitive policy is a 27% increase in capability per cycle resulting in an average deployed 
capability of 11.7—whereas the optimal symmetric cooperative policy is a 24% increase in 
capability per cycle with an average deployed capability of 12.74. (Note that these average 
deployed capabilities are very high because the exponential curve allows for large increases 
in capability very quickly.)  Finally, what happens as we increase the number of critical 
technologies?  It turns out that the situation gets worse.  If there are three critical 
technologies, the competitive policy is to pursue a 33% increase in capability per cycle for 
an average deployed capability of 1.76.  Meanwhile, the optimal symmetric cooperative 
policy for three identical technologies is to target a less-than-11% gain in capability per cycle 
resulting in an average deployed capability of 3.93.   
Thus, the key result from this analysis is that when an acquisition program relies on 
more than one critical technology, the relationship between competitive and cooperative 
behavior is fairly robust.  The cooperative policy yields superior performance through smaller 
capability increments but is unstable.  Without enforcement, the situation devolves to a 
suboptimal Nash equilibrium that achieves inferior performance through larger capability 
increments.  
Cost Considerations 
Up until this point we have only considered performance, and we have omitted any 
discussion of cost.  An evolutionary approach to acquisition may achieve a higher deployed 
performance on average, but is it more cost-effective?  This question is a little more difficult 
to answer; it depends in large part on the relative costs to produce and deploy the 
replacement system (or upgrade the old system) at the end of each cycle, as well as on the 
relationship between technology maturity and development cost.  All else being equal, we 
can say that there is a tradeoff between cost and performance in terms of cycle-time.  More 
frequent, shorter cycles mean that overhead costs associated with an acquisition cycle are 
incurred more often.  Consequently, costs will increase when the cycle-time is shorter.  The 
relative magnitudes of cycle costs versus development costs will dictate the severity this 
tradeoff.  More expensive development costs reduce the contribution of cycle costs as a 
percentage of the overall acquisition bill. Thus, the tradeoff becomes less severe.  If, on the 
other hand, cycle costs are very high (e.g., from high manufacturing costs), increasing the 
length of acquisition cycles may be more appealing. 
The missing piece here is the impact of technological maturity on cost. Does the 
inclusion of immature technology in an acquisition program require the use of more 
expensive development methods than if the same technology were pursued in a research 
and development setting?  Does the inclusion of immature technology make system 
integration more difficult and expensive than when mature technology is employed?  
Conventional wisdom would suggest that the answer to both of these questions is yes, and if 
so, there could be an optimal technology policy that minimizes cost. 
We can demonstrate, at least in a simplistic way, that it is possible to achieve lower 
costs through an evolutionary strategy.  Let us assume that we have a system with a single 
capability, and we can upgrade that capability though either one large leap or multiple small 
steps.  Both achieve the same end capability, but increasing the number of cycles to 
achieve it increases the maturity of the technology we use in each cycle.  For example, we 
could achieve a 25% increase in capability all at once or through two steps that sequentially 
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increase capability by 11.8% each time.  The capability outcome is the same in either case, 
but the time to achieve it may differ.  In fact, if we use the baseline risk-return relationship 
described earlier, the one-step strategy is expected to take 5.27 years (assuming no 
integration time), whereas the two-step strategy is expected to take 4.46 years.  Of course, 
the addition of integration time could erode the time advantage provided by multiple steps, 
but at least notionally we can see that there could be some cost advantage to taking 
multiple, less-risky steps.  If we assume that the development costs are the same in both 
cases, the cost difference comes down to the overhead associated with each acquisition 
cycle.  Again, for the sake of simplicity, if we assume that the cycle costs are the same 
regardless of the aggressiveness of the technology policy, we can determine the conditions 
under which the evolutionary strategy is more cost-effective.  To make this explicit, let us 
define some variables. 
n = the number of steps in the evolutionary policy 
D(n) = the expected length of each step when there are n steps 
CD = the cost rate for development work 
CO = the overhead cost for each acquisition cycle 
As above, we assume that we have two policy options that achieve the same 
increase in capability.  However, the first policy option achieves it in one step, while the 
second achieves it in n steps.  We want to find the conditions under which the n-step policy 
is more cost-effective than the one-step policy.  
Equation 1.     ODOD CCDnCCnnD  1  
Rearranging terms yields: 
Equation 2. 











Thus, we can characterize the cost-effectiveness of the evolutionary policy in terms 
of the ratio of the cycle costs to the development costs.  For the example discussed above, 
the two-stage policy is more cost-effective when the ratio of the cycle cost to the 
development cost rate is less than 0.81.  However, this analysis is admittedly oversimplified 
and only reveals the possibility that an evolutionary strategy could be less expensive. 
Additional work is needed to model cost in a more realistic manner.  Empirical 
studies regarding software development reveal that for large projects, the cost savings from 
a spiral approach can be substantial (Boehm, 2007).  This occurs because the upfront 
investment in better systems engineering and spiral risk reduction is outweighed by the 
reduction in rework.  This is especially true for complex software systems.  This result, while 
particular to software systems, is suggestive and may imply that the adverse cost impacts of 
including immature technologies in a single acquisition cycle may be substantial.  Thus, to 
effectively model cost, we must consider the possible approaches to developing 
technologies. 
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One approach is to leave technologies in the R&D process longer so that they are 
more mature when they are finally included in an acquisition program.  The advantage to 
this approach is that technologies can be managed in a portfolio setting. That means 
funding can be balanced and allocated to maximize the technological options available to 
acquisition programs.  If, for example, in the course of development, a particular technology 
proves to be problematic or not as effective as anticipated, funding may be shifted to an 
alternate approach to provide a needed capability.  In contrast, once technologies are 
included in an acquisition program, some of this flexibility is lost.  There is a great deal of 
commitment to a particular design approach, and it may be difficult or prohibitively 
expensive to change it in the event that a selected technology underperforms.  Thus, to 
really model the cost implications of evolutionary acquisition, one would need to model the 
cost impacts of withdrawing technologies from the R&D portfolios at various levels of 
maturity.  This must be relegated to future work.  
Conclusions 
What we can conclude from this analysis is that, from a performance standpoint, 
every acquisition program has some optimal technology policy that is dependent upon the 
nature of the system and technologies involved. Unfortunately, the implementation of this 
optimal acquisition strategy is not trivial.  The increased emphasis on multi-mission or multi-
capability platforms may lead to overall cost savings and increased flexibility, but it creates a 
tension between the competing missions and capabilities.  A multi-mission platform means 
that some capability must be sacrificed relative to a specialized system in order to deliver 
the system in a reasonable time frame and to maintain the optimal acquisition strategy. The 
result is that the optimal strategy requires an unstable technology policy that incentivizes 
stakeholders to deviate from that policy.  Thus, there is a tendency in the Department of 
Defense to pursue an overly aggressive technology policy.  In as much as the optimal policy 
tends to be more moderate than the stable policy, we can say that the former is more 
evolutionary, while the latter is more revolutionary.  The implication is that while evolutionary 
acquisition is more appealing from a performance standpoint, revolutionary acquisition is the 
more natural outcome. This means that the Department of Defense cannot expect programs 
to voluntarily comply with evolutionary acquisition procedures since the nature of the system 
pressures programs towards revolutionary leaps in technology.  Consequently, if the DoD is 
serious about evolutionary acquisition, technology-maturity requirements must be strictly 
enforced. 
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